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Essential Issues
The financial and economic crisis has drawn attention to the need for a better understanding of 
destabilising effects that arise in the financial sector and spill over to the real economy. In turn, 
weakening economic conditions are likely to feed back to the financial sector, thus giving rise to 
an adverse feedback loop.
The results of past studies indicate that financial stress–which is a reflection of vulnerability in the 
financial system–has a strong regime-specific impact on the real economy. Thereby, the literature 
distinguishes between high and low financial stress regimes. Almost all past studies have found 
that the financial sector exerts extremely negative effects after an increase of financial stress on 
economic activity in a distressed period and relatively small or even negligible negative effects 
in a low stress period. What has been lacking so far is research on financial sector and output 
dynamics as they may unfold over time. During some downswings the effect of financial sector 
instability on economic activity may be more severe than during others.
 ͮ A shock to the financial sector–such as the Lehman Brothers collapse–can lead to a long-
lasting negative response in economic activity. We document this effect for several euro area 
countries between September 2008 and January 2013. A high financial stress regime mostly 
amplifies negative effects on output.  
 ͮ We find that with a largely bank-based financial sector, the recovery of the real economy af-
ter a financial sector shock takes longer. Furthermore, the shock has a more persistent impact 
on the real economy than in a market-based financial sector. 
 ͮ However, we also show that financial stress does not always have a negative impact on out-
put. This holds true specifically for the time before the Lehman collapse. After the crash, how-
ever, we observe the presence of strong amplification mechanisms. This suggests that events 
leading to a major economic breakdown are rare but large events, and they are related to a low-
frequency financial cycle.
Research Question and Relevance
Recent studies incorporate financial market frictions such as credit constraints into theoretical 
models in order to analyse spillover mechanisms from the financial sector to the real economy. 
This new strand in the literature concentrates particularly on the banking sector as a source of 
business cycle dynamics. As a result, non-standard amplification mechanisms such as credit 
channels or financial stress are becoming more important in theoretical economic modelling. 
These studies examine the balance sheets of banks, showing that a downward spiral is triggered 
through overleveraging, financial interdependencies, and contagion effects. The new theoretical 
models are similar in that they highlight (1) the critical impact exerted by financial sector dynam-
ics and (2) amplification and destabilising effects on economic activity.
In our work we pursue this line of research, analysing empirically for several euro area countries the 
feedback and amplification mechanisms that link financial sector dynamics to economic downturns. 
Methods and Data
To analyse the relation between the financial sector and economic activity, we have developed indices 
to assess the status of financial markets in eleven euro area countries. These ZEW Financial Condition 
Indices (FCIs) measure stress levels in the financial sector. To model economic activity, we use data 
on monthly growth in industrial production, expressed in constant prices and seasonally adjusted. 
The ZEW FCIs cover three categories: the banking sector, the securities market, and the foreign ex-
change market. Our data set is comprehensive in terms of broadness of financial stress categories and 
country coverage. While some of these variables are neglected in the existing indices, in our view they 
play an important role in describing financial market stress and the way it has unfolded, for example, 
after the Lehman collapse. Many of the existing indices focus predominantly on price variables, like 
TED or interbank rate spreads. Our index, however, also tracks market volumes, particularly within 
the banking sector. Clearly, there are strong interdependencies between the banking sector and the 
performance of both the financial sector and the real economy. For this reason, we believe the inclu-
sion of banking-related factors with a strong link to the economic downturn improves the accuracy and 
performance of our indices. Furthermore, some of our additional measures incorporate the insights 
of recently developed theoretical models, including the annual growth rate of assets over liabilities, 
which represents available bank collateral; the ratio of short- over long-term debt securities issued 
by banks; and the annual growth rate of bank lending to the private sector. The latter two indicators 
particularly mirror credit conditions as well as banking sector liquidity and confidence. If financial in-
termediaries lend more in the short term and less in the long term, this indicates higher uncertainty 
and increasing mistrust of market conditions and participants. We would like to emphasize that it is 
not sufficient to only construct an aggregate euro area indicator. Such an index would not adequately 
take into account the heterogeneity of the financial sector in individual euro area states.
The FCIs are available for Belgium, Germany, Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, and Spain from January 1980 to January 2013 on a monthly basis (see figure on 
page 3). The FCIs for the euro area countries properly capture country-specific as well as euro area-
wide stress periods. This means that they accurately indicate financial stress in response to experi-
enced financial market and banking turmoil. They also properly reflect the risk associated with the 
financial market breakdown in Europe in 2008, as well as the sovereign debt crisis that began to un-
fold in 2011. The ZEW FCIs are negatively correlated with the growth rates of industrial production 
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in each respective country. We therefore believe that the ZEW FCIs can furnish valuable new insights 
into the link between financial sector turmoil and economic dynamics in several euro area countries.
Research Results in Detail
Drawing on the ZEW FCIs and industrial production growth rates as a measure of economic activ-
ity, we explore the nexus between the financial sector and the real economy, examining how it has 
evolved over time. In most countries, a shock in the financial market leads to a long-lasting negative 
response in economic activity. This shock is particularly harmful to the real economy if it takes place 
during a period of high financial market stress. Under a high stress regime, the financial system of a 
country is under strain. Under a low stress regime, the system is more or less free from adverse pres-
sure. Moreover, recessions are more severe and recovery takes longer when shocks emanate from 
bank-based rather than market-based financial sectors. 
Nevertheless, outcomes depend crucially on the time period under study. Our data show that the 
dynamics of the link between the financial sector and output vary over time in euro area countries.
There have been systematic changes in the amplification mechanisms over time, as can be seen 
for Germany in the table below. After September 2008–when Lehman Brothers collapsed and the 
financial markets in most advanced economies crashed–the response of industrial production was 
clearly negative, whereas it had varied around zero before. Moreover, our results suggest counterin-
tuitively that prior to the crisis, impacts on output were stronger during low than high stress periods. 
The outcomes do not confirm the argument that the financial crisis was only an unusually large shock 
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Mean of accumulated response of industrial production after normalized shock in FCI, Germany
full sample pre-crisis sample crisis sample
low stress high stress low stress high stress low stress high stress
6 months -0.26% 0.00% -0.24% -0.14% -0.33% -0.49%
12 months -0.34% -0.03% -0.31% -0.15% -0.47% -0.62%
18 months -0.37% -0.04% -0.33% -0.15% -0.51% -0.65%
24 months -0.38% -0.04% -0.34% -0.15% -0.51% -0.66%
Full sample refers to January 1980 – January 2013, the pre-crisis sample to January 1980 – August 2008 and the crisis sample to September 
2008 – January 2013.
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that resulted in macroeconomic fluctuations similar to those expected during normal times, since 
we control for the shock size. Accordingly, the change in the dynamics and intensity of the negative 
impact on the real economy is not solely driven by the size of the shock.
The stronger amplification mechanisms arising after the Lehman collapse reflect asymmetric behav-
iour on the part of the financial sector output link that may not have been present or had perhaps 
been rather weak previously. The underlying ZEW FCI for Germany also captures euro area and, to 
some extent, global risk. Hence, the financial sector shock may be seen as a source of the financial 
and economic crisis, but the severe economic downturn may then have been reinforced by global ef-
fects influencing one another and interdependencies between financial markets. This then resulted, 
among other outcomes, in an export slump in Germany. The outlier event “Lehman Brothers collapse” 
and the subsequent euro area crisis constitute situations of greater real economy sensitivity to finan-
cial market fragility. While it would be possible to have a period of high stress without consequenc-
es for the real economy if the amplification effects are weaker, the recent crisis points to systematic 
changes in output fluctuations and financial sector dynamics when compared to previous periods.
Our findings suggest a financial cycle interpretation: events, such as the financial market collapse 
in 2008, that lead to a major economic breakdown appear to be related to a financial cycle that is 
of low frequency. Accordingly, these events have a rare but large impact on economic downturn. 
Stronger Amplification 
Mechanisms after the 
Lehman Collapse
